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#### Background: The debate community avoids discussing Anti-Asian racism like the plague…

#### China has been a major part of each college resolution for the past three years, but people still can’t pronounce President Xi. Those are the same people who are the first to dock speaker points from Asian debaters for vocal inflections, tonal shifts, and accents that dance past white ears. Furthermore, every core neg argument the past four years outlined in topic papers have included iterations of Chinese deterrence that demonstrate a consistent and desired effort to make Sinophobia a stable and predictable research item

#### First question: Who/What killed Vincent Chin?

Warikoo 17 (Niraj Warikoo, Reporter for the Detroit Free Press, “Vincent Chin murder 35 years later: History repeating itself?,” June 23, 2017, <https://www.freep.com/story/news/2017/06/24/murder-vincent-chin-35-years-ago-remembered-asian-americans/420354001/>)

Thirty-five years ago this week, Gary Koivu visited a Detroit hospital to see his friend Vincent Chin, his head swathed in bandages after being slugged in Highland Park by a man with a baseball bat. "It was very upsetting," recalled Koivu, 61, of Harrison Township, who was 26 at the time of the incident. "I had been friends with him for 20 years. I asked the nurse, How is he doing? What are his chances? She said, he has no chance, she said his brain was dead." A couple of days later, Chin died, 35 years ago Thursday. The tragic death — and subsequent lenient punishment (probation and a $3,000 fine) — outraged Asian Americans in Detroit. They organized, forming new coalitions and the civil rights group American Citizens for Justice, sparking an Asian-American civil rights movement that continues today. On Saturday, a forum will be held at a Chinese-American center in Madison Heights to remember Vincent Chin with a documentary screening, panel discussion with Koivu and the director of Michigan's Civil Rights Dept. and a visit to Chin's grave site in Detroit. Of Chinese descent, Chin was an adopted son of immigrants from China in metro Detroit. The case of Vincent Chin reverberates today amid renewed concern about hate crimes and anti-immigrant sentiment, say Asian-American attorneys in metro Detroit. They point to the shooting death in Kansas in February of an Indian-American man, Srinivas Kuchibhotla, by a suspect who yelled, "Get out of my country" and asked if he was a legal immigrant before shooting him and another Indian American. Federal prosecutors have filed hate crime charges in the case. In Michigan, there was an upswing in hate crimes against minorities after the November election, according to state officials. And Michigan had the highest number of hate crimes post-election in the Midwest, according to the Southern Poverty Law Center. "History seems to be repeating itself," said James Shimoura, a Sylvan Lake attorney of Japanese descent who was active in organizing after the Chin case in the 1980s. "Some always try to find scapegoats for social and economic ills. The target changes, but same issue." The June 1982 incident started after an attacker yelled at Chin: "It's because of you little (expletives) that we're out of work!" and anti-Asian racial slurs denigrating Chinese and Japanese people. In 1982, metro Detroit was going through a recession with many autoworkers out of work as anti-Asian racism, in particular against Japan, began to rise. Auto executives, union leaders and politicians in Michigan made anti-Japanese remarks, creating a climate that made many Asian Americans uneasy. Anyone who looked Japanese in the early 1980s or any Asian American, we all felt like moving targets," said author Helen Zia, who was an unemployed autoworker of Chinese descent living in Detroit at the time of the Vincent Chin killing. "People who drove cars of Japanese models were shot at on the freeway. ... That's the climate I remember 35 years ago." Shimoura said "it was a powder keg" of racial animosity that exploded at a bar Chin was at in Highland Park with friends to celebrate before his upcoming wedding. After a scuffle inside the bar, Ronald Ebens, who worked in the auto industry, and his stepson, Michael Nitz, later chased down Chin, smashing his head with a bat.

#### Second Question: Who/What will they kill next?

Espiritu 93 (Yen Le, Espiritu, Distinguished Professor of Ethnic Studies at UC San Diego, “Asian American Panethnicity,” 1993, Temple University Press) \*inserted quotations marked by brackets

Factors Contributing to Anti-Asian Activities Social scientists continue to debate the etiology of intergroup conflicts. Most of the dialogue has been structured around a confrontation between class-based and race-based theorists. For class-based theorists, economic competition plays the central role in structuring social relations (Bonacich 1972; Cummings 1980). In contrast, race-based theorists insist that unfavorable attitudes toward a racial group cause intergroup conflicts (Allport 1958; Myrdal 1962). As III many cases of racial conflicts, factors that contribute to antiAsian activities include class as well as ideational elements. Economic Competition Resource competition theory posits that self-interest explains public animosity toward immigrants. Especially during economic downturns, the [“]native-born[“] blame immigrants for the nation's problems and regard them as unwanted competitors (Bonacich 1972; Light 1983: ch. 13). Historically, Asians in the United States have borne most of the blame for economic woes (Saxton 1971; Kitano 1980; K. Wong 1985). Recent anti-Asian activities coincided with the deteriorating economic conditions that began after 1975. In a context of high unemployment, climbing inflation, and skyrocketing interest rates, competition between Asians and non-Asians often escalated into intergroup conflicts (California, Governor's Task Force on Civil Rights 1982; Los Angeles County Commission on Human Relations 1984; U.S. Commission on Civil Rights 1986). A 1980 poll conducted in nine cities indicated that 47 percent of the respondents believed that "Indochinese refugees take jobs away from others in my area" I Starr and Roberts 1982). According to a 1989 Los Angeles Times poll, a quarter of the respondents believed that Asian Americans were gaining too much economic power; no other group was similarly described by more than 7 percent IRoderick 1989Q). The mushrooming of Asian businesses across the country has also evoked anti-Asian sentiment, often expressed in efforts to ban Asian-language business signs (Fong 1987; Siao 1989Q). The rapid influx of Asian immigrants to the United States since 1965 further exacerbated the tension between Asians and non-Asians IDesbarats 1985: 522-523). In particular, the growing presence of Korean businesses in black neighborhoods in Baltimore, Philadelphia, Washington, D.C., New York City, and Los Angeles has fueled black anger, at times leading to racial violence II. Kim 1981; Light and Bonacich 1988: ch. 12; Cheng and Espiritu 1989). In addition to actual or alleged domestic economic competition, Asian Americans are resented for the United States' international trade imbalances. A period of economic recession in the United States coincided with a rise of Pacific Rim economies, not only that of Japan but also those of Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong, and Singapore. Unable to keep pace with Asian competition, traditional industries such as steel and automobiles experienced severe downturns. American businesses and labor unions, as well as elected officials, blamed the ills of American industry on business competition with Asian countries ISmollar 1983; US. Commission on Civil Rights 1986: 36-37). A prime example is automobile manufacturing: many Americans attributed the unemployment among American automobile workers to the large Japanese share of automobiles sold in the United States IUS. Commission on Civil Rights 1986: 36). A 1982 national poll indicated that 44 percent of the public blamed US. economic problems "almost completely" or "very much'! on Japanese business competition 1M. Woo 1983). Anti-Japanese sentiment appeared on bumper stickers that read "Toyota-Datsun-Honda-and Pearl Harbor" and "Unemployment Made in Japan" IUS. Commission on Civil Rights 1986: 40). Unfortunately, anger against Asian nations is often transferred to Americans of Asian ancestry, who have suffered from a long history of anti-Asian attitudes and behaviors (Los Angeles County Commission on Human Relations 1984: 2; R. Matsui 1984: 63). Attitudinal surveys reveal that anti-Asian sentiments are still alive and well today. In a survey of 2,000 Americans, the Roper Organization (19821 asked respondents to indicate whether each of the fifteen ethnic groups listed has "on balance . .. been a good thing or a bad thing for this couptry." No European group received lower than a 53 percent positive ratingj in contrast; no Asian group received higher than a 47 percent positive rating. Survey results also indicate that many Americans do not welcome Asian immigrants and refugees. According to a 1975 Harris poll, more than 50 percent of the American people thought Southeast Asian refugees should not be allowed to enter the United Statesj only 26 percent favored their entry. Many seemed to share Congressman Burt Talcott's conclusion that, "Damn it, we have too many Orientals" (cited in Rose 1985: 2051. Five years later, public opinion toward the refugees had not changed. A 1980 poll of American attitudes in nine cities revealed that nearly half of those surveyed believed that the Southeast Asian refugees should have settled in other Asian countries (Starr and Roberts 198 I I. This poll also found that over 77 percent of the respondents would disapprove of the marriage of a Southeast Asian refugee into their family and 65 percent would not be willing to have a refugee as a guest in their home (Roberts 1988: 811· Anti-Asian sentiment seemed to be symptomatic of the general anti-immigrant mood beginning in the late 1970s. Poll results indicated that, between 1965 and 1981, the proportion of the US. public favoring a decrease in legal immigration rose sharply (California, Governor's Task Force on Civil Rights 1982 : 521. However, opposition toward immigrants was not directed equally toward all groups. A survey of San Diego County found that 36 percent of the respondents believed Asian immigrants had a negatIve impact on the city, but only 17 percent thought Western European immigrants had a negative impact (Cornelius 1982: 161. Along the same lines, the media decry Japanese ownership of US. property but largely ignore European investment-even though Europeans own the most American real estate.2 In 1985, the British held $44 billion and the Dutch $38 billion in US. real estate. In contrast, the Japanese owned $35 billion in US. real estate in 1988. The disproportionate political and media attention to Japanese ownership suggests "that the professed concern for overseas ownership is a smokescreen for racial animosity toward Asians" (California, Attorney General's Commission 1986: 27-28).

#### Third question: Who/What is the aff cooperating for/against?

Espiritu 93 (Yen Le, Espiritu, Distinguished Professor of Ethnic Studies at UC San Diego, “Asian American Panethnicity,” 1993, Temple University Press)

Research on ethnicity has indicated that external threats intensify group cohesion as members band together in defensive solidarities. The threatened destruction creates a common interest where none may have existed before (Coser 1956; Portes 19841. Most often, a group is sanctioned for its actual or alleged wrongdoing. But a racially defined group can also suffer reprisals because of its externally imposed membership in a larger group. In the Asian American case, group members can suffer sanctions for no behavior of their own, but for the activities of others who resemble them (Light and Bonacich 1988: 3241· Thus anti-Asian activities necessarily lead to protective pan-Asian ethnicity. True, as indicated by the discussion on ethnic "disidentification" in Chapter 2, external threat does not always consolidate groups, but can also disintegrate them. However, it is also true that these early attempts by Asian immigrant groups to "disidentify" themselves from the targeted Asian group often failed. The most notorious case of mistaken identity was the 1982 killing of Vincent Chin, a Chinese American who was beaten to death by two white men who allegedly mistook him for Japanese. The Chin case activated both Chinese and pan-Asian levels of solidarity. To understand the web of reactive solidarities better, this chapter analyzes Asian American organizational responses to anti-Asian activities, particularly their responses to the Chin case. The Chin case is substantively important because many Asian Americans now consider it to be the archetype of anti-Asian violence in this country. It is also theoretically instructive because it sheds light on the pluralism of reactive groups. Anti-Asian Activities Anti-Asian activities in the United States can be traced back to the middle of the nineteenth century. For the most part, Americans meted out sanctions against Asians via the political and legal systems (McKenzie 1928i Ichioka 1988). From the late nineteenth to the early twentieth century, more than six hundred pieces of anti-Asian legislation were enacted, either limiting or excluding persons of Asian ancestry from citizenship, intermarriage, land ownership, employment, and other forms of participation in American life (Japanese American Citizens League 1987 : 65i Chan 1991 : ch. 3). As indicated earlier, the gravest government mistreatment of Asians occurred when Japanese residents and citizens were placed in relocation camps at the beginning of World War II (Daniels 1971). Anti-Asian hostility also took violent turns. In the mid-nineteenth century, whites "were stoning the Chinese in the streets, cutting off their queues, wrecking their shops and laundries" (Dulles 1946: 89). In some instances, such as the Rock Springs Massacre in Wyoming in 1885, these violent outbursts ended in brutal killings. For the most part, these atrocities were legally sanctioned. For example, in 1854, the California Supreme Court ruled that Chinese could not testify against whites. So long as no white person was available to witness on their behalf, any crime perpetrated against the Chinese went unpunished (Dulles 1946). During World War II, the United States Congress began to chip away at the legislative barriers to Asian immigration and citizenship. By the early 1970s, Asian Americans were finally accorded the civil rights long guaranteed to other residents and citizens. But in the late 1970S, reports of rising anti-Asian activities also began to surface. At a congressional hearing on the impact of the new Asian immigration, an Asian American attorney contended that "today we are witnessing a resurgence of anti-Asian sentiment manifest by growing problems of vandalism, physical attack, and on occasion murder" (K. Wong 198 s: 1731· In a statement submitted to the US. Commission on Civil Rights, US. Representative Robert Matsui (19841 warned of the danger of rising anti-Asianism. In a 1988 keynote speech, the founding president of the Asian/ Pacific Bar of California similarly warned, "The danger I see in the next decade is the revitalization of anti-Asian hostility" (Asian Pacific American Coalition 1989al. Because no systematic data on anti-Asian Activities exist, it is difficult to substantiate the claim of rising anti-Asianism. As the US. Commission on Civil Rights (1986: 5) reported, "There is currently no way to determine accurately the level of activity against persons of Asian descent, or whether the number of incidents has increased, decreased, or stayed the same in recent years." On the other hand, rising anti-Asianism has become so alarming that it has entered the public discourse, as evidenced by an increase in the number of articles on anti-Asian violence published not only in the ethnic press but also in major newspapers such as the New York Times, Wall Street Journal, Boston Globe, Washington Post, San Francisco Examiner, and Los Angeles Times (Japanese American Citizens League 1987: 66-671. Federal, state, and local civil rights bodies extended this public discourse by holding official hearings on anti-Asian crimes. At a Los Angeles County hearing, twenty-two persons testified that the "Asian community has been alarmed by an increase anti-Asian vandalism and violence in Los Angeles County and in other parts of the country" (Los Angeles County Commission on Human Relations 19841· These racial incidents ranged from hostile bumper stickers to racial name-calling to physical assaults. In Washington, a state commission reported that Asians in the state had experienced harassment of "very serious proportions" at the hands of "native workers" (Koreatown 19831. In California, the attorney general's Asian and Pacific Islander Advisory Committee concluded that, "in recent years, there has been an intensification of anti-Asian hostility" (California, Attorney General's Asian and Pacific Islander Advisory Committee 1988: 23). At the national level, a multisite study by the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights (1986: 5) concluded that "anti-Asian activity exists in numerous and demographically different communities across the Nation." In the absence of longitudinal data, these studies cannot substantiate the claim of rising violence against Asians; however, they do confirm that anti-Asianism is, indeed, a serious problem.

#### Yellow Peril is an existential threat – American policymaking drives pathological understandings of Asianness that threatens the very health of US Empire – this produces an apocalyptic form of securitization where contact itself becomes the legitimation of exclusion

Man 18. Jessica Man, Master of Arts degree in Asian American Studies, “The Perfect Type of Industry”: 2012 and Apocalyptic Visions of the Asian Century, *UCLA Electronic Theses and Dissertations*, Published 2018-01-01

“Eschaton” (from the Greek éskhaton, “the last”) refers specifically to the events of the end which bring about the future state that apocalypse reveals; the apocalypse is the method through which John delivers his description of the eschaton. An eschatology orders and gives meaning to those events. Whereas an apocalypse is an interpretive system that imputatively reframes an historical narrative, an eschatology selects the events that represent the culmination of that narrative, describing their fruition in teleological terms. John’s apocalypse is an eschatological device. In this way, the Exclusion Act, the Asiatic Barred Zone Act, and other turn-of-the century immigration acts can be understood to constitute a state or state-sanctioned eschatology. Protective and nationalist legislation is always instated to narrow down the possible futures of empire and empire’s end. If American triumphalism is a belief in the inevitable dominance of U.S. government, culture, and ways of life over those of other nations, it must be maintained and driven by an eschatological imaginary that exposes weaknesses in the imperial strategy and thinks about the ways through which the empire could be destroyed. London’s “Unparalleled Invasion” provides an apocalypse that exposes the eschatological nature of the Exclusion Act and how it anticipated the fundamental threat Chinese laborers posed to the American nationstate. The Exclusion Act and all other anti-Asian immigration laws function on, and are justified through, an imagined future predicated on the destructive power of Yellow Peril, validating a specific vision of eschaton and apocalyptically reframing the nature of Asian immigration. Apocalypse necessarily deals with periodicity. Christian theology recognizes several “marks” in its historical record: pre- and post-lapsarian time, ante- and post-diluvian time, pre and post-messianic time, pre- and post-apocalyptic time, and so forth. It also recognizes the nebulous and intractable nature of time – Giorgio Agamben notes in Infancy and History that Christianity “resolutely separates time from the natural movement of the stars to make it an essentially human, interior phenomenon” (95). The Second Epistle of Peter corroborates this observation, famously stating that “with the Lord one day is as a thousand years, and a thousand years as one day” (3:8, ESV). Eschatology therefore must be understood to extrapolate from a specific system of periodizing or marking history, but purposefully leave the actual span of the period it envelops unclear in order to avoid foreclosing itself at a certain date. In a state sanctioned eschatology, the effect is to suspend, extend, and frame the period of imperial life so that the end state of totalized destruction hangs ominously over the present moment, continually presenting a justification for exclusion and border maintenance as nationalist projects of conservation. A state-sanctioned eschatology can be expressed both through law and through cultural production, as Jack London, Robert Heinlein, and Philip F. Nowlan have aptly demonstrated. Alongside London’s “Unparalleled Invasion,” Heinlein’s The War in the Air and Nowlan’s Armageddon 2149 AD present speculative narratives that describe a Sino-American war and an American landscape under Chinese rule. Aris Mousoutzanis makes a critical intervention here in Fin-de-Siècle Fictions, 1890s/1990s by identifying apocalypse as “a form of colonization that is enacted at the interstices of technoscientific and biopolitical discourses, a motif whose early traces may be identified… as ‘reverse colonization’ narratives” (154-155). All three of these texts anticipate Chinese ascendancy and hypothesize about methods of American resistance to invasion, a tradition that has evolved alongside American anxieties about China. Now, in a global economy where China has become not only a source of stigmatized and abjected labor but also a formidable creditor of the United States,American fears have left traditional military invasions behind in favor of anticipating a networked apocalypse, where annihilation can be transmitted through bank transfers, airports, computers, and other points of international contact, including, as always, state borders. During the period of 2007-2009 known as The Great Recession, these anxieties were made explicit in the attribution of global economic recession to Chinese insistence on keeping the value of the renminbi stable instead of allowing it to depreciate alongside the American dollar (Kamrany, 2011). By the end of 2010, China owned about $900 billion of the U.S. debt (“Datablog,” 2011), a number which has appreciated beyond $1 trillion in 2018, rousing concerns that China would simply “buy” America and maintain a fiscal stranglehold with unspoken but surely destructive cultural and political consequences. Military conquest is no longer the primary mediator of relations between East Asia and the United States, although this by no means indicates a demilitarization of the area. The creditor-debtor relationship has subsumed the master-coolie relationship, where the status of “creditor” legitimizes a national ownership and therefore control over the labor force, controlling outward migration for its own nationalist projects. The partial upending of the master-coolie relationship, adding the creditor Chinese to the image of the coolie Chinese, and the creation of a global economic system of financial capital, has largely transferred anxieties about Chinese migrant laborers onto the entanglement of Chinese bankers and investors with the American economy and thus the American future, a disorderly relationship that comes much closer to realizing the threat of the Yellow Peril than anything early 20th century writers imagined. State-sanctioned eschatology has also changed since the days of London and Heinlein to reflect globalization and pathological understandings of how the world has been networked and flattened. Before the Great Recession, there was SARS, a disease that originated in southern China but was transmitted through air travel to 37 countries worldwide, including the United States. The worst of the SARS outbreak lasted for five months and was declared the first pandemic to occur in the 21st century (LeDuc and Barry, 2004), confirming fears about increased globalization and the pathological consequences of movement for networked nations that was once the sole claim of immigration. As early as the 1880s and 1890s, American apocalypticism regarding Asia had begun to incorporate ideas about disease, pathogenesis, contagion, and power quite naturally into its ideas about borders and the body politic. Mousoutzanis points out quite clearly that eugenics, disease, entropy, and imperial time were all closely linked at the turn of the 20th century; the second half of the 19th century saw the rise of the germ theory of disease, the laws of thermodynamics and the theory of the heat death of the universe, and eugenics (71-90). Disease and deformity were treated in literature and in popular discourse as entropic indicators of moral and physical decline that contradicted the triumphalist timeline of Christian empire. Entropy itself was extremely upsetting to eternist concepts of time and human survivability, putting an apocalyptic timer on the existence of the entire universe. Eugenics became popular at the time as a way to manage these indicators of declining society – disease, disability, mental illness, and race – and fight entropy, denying the possibility of the death of the universe and reasserting sociopolitical, cultural, and spiritual hierarchies of ability, race, and gender through legislation, medicinal practice, and border control. The idea of border control as preventative medicine already admits to the porous nature of policed boundaries, which McKeown discusses in great depth in his study of the enforcement of the Exclusion Act. Invasion is a type of pathology that completely obliterates borders through phagocytosis, dissolving any identity based on geographical or organ-based (i.e., state) markers. However, in fiction, this sort of dissolution can actually be a source of positive anticipation, because it aesthetically effaces the settler-colonial country and provides a chance to distill its colonial ethos. Paul Williams observes that “the post-apocalyptic world can be an arena for the replaying of the colonial encounter, frightening in its unintelligibility but alluring in its virgin promise… [it] was the most plausible arena in which imperial adventurism could be restaged” (304-305). A state-sanctioned eschatology can therefore also be understood as a contingency plan for the end and the time beyond the end, and not only as a warning system or a means of avoidance. It is also an understanding that the end of empire is not synonymous with the end of its people, and crucially provides a way to propagate its intrinsic power structures and hegemonic values in hopes that it will one day be reestablished in a different form. Postapocalyptic work that does not deconstruct the interlocking forces of patriarchy, criminality, and racialization must envision the nation and the empire as ideology. One of the best examples of this is from the final scene of Werner Herzog’s Aguirre, the Wrath of God, where the titular character stands on the remains of his ruined colonial expedition and declares: “We will produce history as others produce plays… I, the wrath of God, will marry my own daughter, and with her found the purest dynasty the world has ever seen.” Although the particular material structures of empire and means of asserting imperial ambition may crumble with time, a persistent desire for its renewal and recreation will remain – the superstructure will persevere – if the survivors of the eschaton do not enact a radical shift in the nostalgia and desires they carry through the end times.

#### Historic use of antitrust was signaled as the “cure-all” for an increasing racialized fear of communism in Asia and the Middle East. From Hayek’s preaching of the “competition ideal” to the amendment of the Clayton Act,[[1]](#footnote-1) antitrust was repurposed for combatting the growing Red and Yellow Scare. Even now, Biden preaches

Biden 21 https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/07/09/remarks-by-president-biden-at-signing-of-an-executive-order-promoting-competition-in-the-american-economy/

Let me close with this: Competition works. We know it works. We’ve seen it works when it exists. Fair competition is was what made America the wealthiest, most innovative nation in history. That’s why people come here to invent things and start new businesses. In the competition against China and other nations of the 21st century, let’s show that American democracy and the American people can truly outcompete anyone. Because I know that just given half a chance, the American people will never, ever, ever let their country down. Imagine if we give everyone a full and fair chance. That’s what this is all about. That’s what I’m about to do.

#### Even the rhetoric of worker-first models get coopted

Biden 21 https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/07/09/remarks-by-president-biden-at-signing-of-an-executive-order-promoting-competition-in-the-american-economy/

But to keep our country moving, we have to take another step as well — and I know you’re all tired of hearing me during the campaign and since I’m elected President talk about it — and that’s bringing fair competition back to the economy. That’s why today I’m going to be signing shortly an executive order promoting competition to lower price — to lower prices, to increase wages, and to take another critical step toward an economy that works for everybody. The heart of American capitalism is a simple idea: open and fair competition — that means that if your companies want to win your business, they have to go out and they have to up their game; better prices and services; new ideas and products. That competition keeps the economy moving and keeps it growing. Fair competition is why capitalism has been the world’s greatest force for prosperity and growth. By the same token, “competitive economy” means companies must do all they do to do — everything they do to compete for workers: offering higher wages, more flexible hours, better benefits.

#### Stats lie

Blakemore 21 (Erin Blakemore, journalist and publisher of the Heroine’s Bookshelf that won the Harper Award, “The Asian American ‘model minority’ myth masks a history of discrimination,” May 27 2021, national geographic, <https://www.nationalgeographic.com/culture/article/asian-american-model-minority-myth-masks-history-discrimination>)

There was another price to pay: A pervasive myth of docile Asian American achievement took root in the 1950s and 1960s. For over a century, Asians had been scapegoated as racial others not worthy of citizenship or equality. But now as the U.S. courted its potential Cold War allies, Asians were lauded as a desirable, hardworking minority—and upheld as a contrast to other groups, such as Latino and Black Americans, who were characterized as a threat to white supremacy. Japanese Americans, in particular, were singled out as paragons of the American dream. “In spite of being interned by their own government, [Japanese Americans] managed to succeed and become contributing members of society without making a big fuss about being imprisoned against their will,” says Angie Chuang, an associate professor in journalism at the University of Colorado, whose research focuses on race and identity. Though it was fueled by fear, this seeming docility was praised by commentators who were alarmed by other marginalized groups’ growing insistence on their own civil rights. “This is a minority that has risen above even prejudiced criticism,” wrote sociologist William Petersen in a 1966 article in the New York Times Magazine credited with first articulating the myth. Even better, he wrote, they had achieved all of this “by their own almost totally unaided effort.” Law-abiding, hard-working, well-educated, and even well-dressed, Petersen wrote, Japanese Americans had risen above everything American society had thrown at them. He contrasted them with Black Americans, whom he claimed were “problem minorities” who had rightfully earned some of the prejudices against them. The reality, though, was that Asian Americans still faced systemic bias and racial discrimination. So did other people of color, says Chuang. “The model minority myth was used as a way to divide and conquer and to use Asian American immigrants against particularly the Black population,” she says. Even as they were celebrated for their hard work, Asian Americans were used as an excuse not to provide social services or meaningful assistance to any marginalized population. And their labor, says Chuang, continued to be devalued by a nation that had long relied on a “compliant” Asian workforce. Challenging the stereotype Not everyone bought into the myth, however. The same civil rights movement that galvanized Black and Latino communities in the 1950s and 1960s also energized Asian Americans, particularly those who had seen their immigrant parents struggle against all odds only to be used as a wedge against other groups. Over time, a broad coalition of students, educators, labor activists, and community members seeking redress began to assert a common identity and find pride in the languages, cultural practices, names, and physical attributes they had long been taught to suppress. Today, the myth’s consequences are better understood. Lumping together Asian Americans and Pacific Islanders—diverse communities that trace their heritage to over 50 countries and approximately twice as many languages and dialects—collapses individual achievements and can mask disparities and discrimination. Though aggregated data can paint a rosy picture of Asian American accomplishment, Christian Edlagan and Kavya Vaghul, policy experts at the Washington Center for Equitable Growth, note that there is significant variation in income levels, employment rates, and educational attainment. The model minority myth “overstates the success of Asian Americans in terms of resiliency, health, wisdom, and wealth,” wrote a group of public health experts from the New York University School of Medicine in a 2016 commentary. They note that since Asian Americans are assumed not to experience disparities, they are not given vital resources. The pressure of supposedly inherent Asian excellence can also have mental health consequences; the myth has been correlated with everything from increased depression and anxiety to higher suicide rates and lower likelihood of seeking mental health services.

#### Movements are growing and connecting at a greater rate than ever for anticolonial futures. The conglomeration of COVID, accelerating racial violence, and economic inequality put us in a unique position to break away from norms that have brought us to this present crisis. Don’t fear contamination, instead reach out and grasp for a new and better future in this round.

Liu 20 (Wen, Assistant Professor of women’s gender and sexuality studies at the University of Albany, “Internationalism Beyond the ‘Yellow Peril’: On the Possibility of Transnational Asian American Solidarity,” 2020, UC Santa Barbara Journal of Transnational American Studies)

In the midst of a global pandemic and social upheavals, how will transnational Asian–Black solidarity take shape? Currently living in Taipei, Taiwan, I am involved in an emergent circle of diasporic Asian radicals who write and organize around the vibrant left-leaning movements in Taiwan and Hong Kong and seek to build international solidarity based on a critique of both US and Chinese imperialism. This new activist milieu that has been described as “transnationally Asian”5 not only rejects Asian American assimilationist politics and the narrow focus of liberal international politics around democracy and human rights, but also actively seeks cross-national and cross-racial points of racial encounters and challenges the orthodox Western leftist takes on social movements that often defer to a reductionist binarism of “capitalism versus communism.” For example, a Hong Kong activist was excluded from participating in a BLM solidarity event hosted by the Sunrise Movement, an American youth–led climate organization, due to some US leftists’ Twitter commentaries that misrepresented Hong Kong’s protests against Beijing’s increasingly harsh conditions of authoritarian control as being funded by the US military. Writers from Lausan, a leftist Hong Kong press, have condemned such mischaracterization of Hong Kong’s ongoing mass movement as merely manipulated by US imperialism and, instead, insisted on the importance of building alliances between Hong Kong’s struggle against authoritarianism and BLM’s vision of police abolition.6 From this single case, one can understand that building transnational solidarity is complex and arduous work, both conceptually and practically. It requires us to maneuver from one ideological trap to another across geopolitical contexts and locally specific historical conditions. While transnational iteration is emancipatory and necessary to achieve a genuine form of Asian–Black solidarity, it must be built on a bidirectional and bifocal analysis instead of merely relying on the US-centric epistemology of what constitutes leftist politics. By seeking transnationalism from the West toward the non-West and not vice versa, it’s easy to fall into the logic of Western “China apologists” or neo-Cold War logic, dismissing the interasian conflicts that also have global ramifications. To put it in another way, as China criminalizes Hong Kong’s fight for fundamental democratic rights and implements mass arrests of young activists under the National Security Laws,7 a progressive Asian American politics must not only be focused on racial relations domestically but challenge multiple forms of Empire beyond the borders of the US. Only through this multidimensional transnational praxis can we begin to see the underlying mechanisms that allow BLM activists from Minneapolis to Seattle to adopt Hong Kong protesters’ strategies against the police. 8 These possibilities for alliance among “transnationally Asian” activists include protesters in Hong Kong and the US using umbrellas and tennis rackets to protect themselves from tear gas, the joint coalition between Taiwanese indigenous organizations and Black Lives Matter Taiwan calling out racism,9 and Singaporeans debating whether to topple their colonial monuments.10 Our current shared struggles against the rapid right-wing turn of global hegemonies do not draw lines between the simple binaries of “East vs. West,” “white vs. Black,” or “authoritarianism vs. democracy,” but underscore the interconnected fights against the militarized police state, neoliberal capitalist order, Han supremacy, and the continued impacts of Euro-American coloniality. The “yellow peril” may have been a useful metaphor describing the shared racialization of the Asian body against white supremacy and US imperialism; the politics of internationalism in the present conditions requires a much more nuanced analysis of interregional geopolitics across the transpacific. The possibility of transnational Asian American solidarity must be situated beyond the framework of “one united race against one empire.” Indeed, the fast growing infection and mortality rates of Covid-19 show that the virus cannot be simply contained by national borders, and our racial critique must also be extended transnationally. When a disease is racialized, it not only exposes the racial inequalities built in the global public health infrastructures but also how mechanisms of national security require the domination of subjects who are deemed to be “outsiders.” Rather than falling into a nationalistic blame game based on the Cold War logic—choosing sides between one empire (the US) and another (China)—the pandemic requires us to engage in the racial justice and antinativist struggles in our different localities as well as hold one another’s movements accountable to an internationalist vision of collective survival.

### 2

#### CP Text: Istadus unidos ukampirus jan masi pashna.

#### J’ani amuyu

Belcourt 17 (Billy-Ray Belcourt is from Driftpile Cree First Nation. He is a PhD student in the Department of English and Film Studies at the University of Alberta. “The Optics of the Language: How Joi T. Arcand Looks with Words.” 8-29-17. <https://canadianart.ca/features/optics-language-joi-t-arcand-looks-words/> //shree)

What did Bushby see? In his formulation, “one” brings into focus a sinister optic, where “optic” is the lens or filter by which one looks and from this looking ropes what is seen into an encounter humming with all sorts of potential. Bushby’s is an optic that mediates the interpellative call “one” seeks to enact—it is a part of the grammar of settler horror. “One” is thus a modality by which we, the ante-Canada, those of us who bear that which is prior to and beneath Canada, are racialized and roped into a representational field where all things, like trailer hitches, can be put to violent use. We cannot survive in the visual register of “one.” Words are worldly; not just in the sense that they proliferate and float up into the sky and become cloud-like. Words world too. Words like “one” incubate death-worlds (see Achille Mbembe’s 2003 essay “Necropolitics”) inside which those of us who look like Kentner are made to inhabit modes of enfleshment that fix the stares of the grim reapers of the present. On the other hand, some of us recruit words in the name of something like freedom. We might call this duality the double-bind of enunciation. How do we refuse a savage call to being with a more spacious one? Joi T. Arcand is a photo-based artist and industrial sculptor from Muskeg Lake Cree Nation, and she knows that words, that letter forms, shapes and glyphs, “change the visual landscape,” that they are how we go about practicing new ways of looking. Words are emotional architectures, and Arcand calls hers “Future Earth.” In her 2015 book The Argonauts, Maggie Nelson tends to a debate about whether words do or do not potentiate. She takes up a claim of a partner’s that words do nothing but nominalize, and what is left unnamed is subject to a host of horrors. Nelson, however, holds out more hope for words; she contends that they are “good enough,” that how one speaks makes all of the difference and that words can, following Deleuze, incite “the outline of a becoming.” Bushby’s angered vocalization of a genre of non-being—where “one” is the refusal of a name and the humanity that comes with it—is evidence of the terrible mechanics of language. But, it is in opposition to this linguistic state of killability, this metaphysics and rhetoric of coloniality, that Arcand articulates a grammar of subjectivity vis-à-vis the time and space of a native future. Here on Future Earth is a series of photographs that Arcand produced in 2010. In a phone interview, Arcand explained to me that this is where her photo-based practice and her interest in textuality synched. Arcand wants us to think about these photographs as documents of “an alternative present,” of a future that is within arm’s reach. For this series, Arcand manipulated signs and replaced their slogans and names with Cree syllabics. By doing this, Arcand images something of a present beside itself and therefore loops us into a new mode of perception, one that enables us to attune to the rogue possibilities bubbling up in the thick ordinariness of everyday life. Arcand wanted to see things “where they weren’t.” Hers is not a utopian elsewhere we need to map out via an ethos of discovery. Rather, Arcand straddles the threshold of radical hope. She asks us to orient ourselves to the world as if we were out to document or to think back on a future past. That is, Arcand rendered these photographs with a pink hue and a thick, round border, tapping into what she calls “the signifiers of nostalgia.” Importantly, these signifiers are inextricably bound to the charisma of words, to the emotional life of the syllabics. The syllabics are what enunciate; they potentiate a performance of world-making that does not belong to the mise-en-scene of settlement. It is this mise-en-scene of settlement that Arcand conjures to then obliterate, which is to say that her photographs evince a prairie world that is crowded with meaning, meaning that belongs differently to the logic of terra nullius (that a place exists without history or politics prior to European settlement) and to myths of Indian savagery and degeneracy. It is against this system of signs that Arcand opens the prairies up to radical resignification. It is where we build a future atop the decayed remains of coloniality. Perhaps Here on Future Earth visually captures the tempos of “Indian time,” which is always a scene of errant temporality. Indian time is less about the absence of rhythm and more about an inability to fix or to analytically hold up the rhythmic as a mode of feral movement itself. Words like “one” are spun such that they stomp us into the rut of social death. But: Indian time evinces an otherwise kinetics. In Here on Future Earth, this kinetics is energized by the textual, by the stories that they tell, and their visual culture. The modified signs exploit our ability to look; that we see them and conceptualize them as out of place or untimely is how we transport ourselves to a different time, to a place governed by Indian time. The syllabics themselves map a visual field. This is what Arcand calls “the optics of the language.” It is around these words that sociality orbits. This thematic persists in Arcand’s latest project, a set of large neon signs that light up Cree words like keyam. For Arcand, all of her engagements with the Cree language are partly elegiac. She is mourning language loss, but puts this negative affect to rebellious use to signify a world-to-come. Like the syllabics in Here on Future Earth, the bright signs prop up affective structures for a time and place where our relations to Cree are not always-already bound up in performances of grief. In one sign, Arcand translates the English phrase “I don’t have the words” into Cree. “I don’t have the words” is a paradoxical speech act; it uses words to announce their absence. These signs are installed in gallery spaces where Arcand’s work is commissioned; one was recently installed at the second gesture of the Wood Land School at the SBC Gallery of Contemporary Art in Montreal, another outside the Walter Phillips Gallery in Banff. These signs interrupt the visual terrain of the gallery, as if welcoming onlookers to a new world, to a new geographic form. The signs something like kinship around a common wordlessness in the service of a new world-making praxis. These photographs and signs, then, are all relics of a future past. They emerge from something of an anthropological interest in a future-in-the-present, in the affects of Indian time. Arcand thus writes the world wrong so that she can write it anew.

### Case

#### The legal poverty threshold still condemns people to bare life – punish 1AC vagueness in relation to being able to solve any of their impacts

Hickel 19 (Jason Hickel, Anthropologist, author, fellow of the Royal Society of Arts, taught at the London School of Economics, University of Virginia, Goldsmiths, and University of London, and on the Executive Board of Academics Stand Against Poverty, “An Open Letter to Steven Pinker (and Bill Gates),” 02/13/2019, <https://jacobinmag.com/2019/02/steven-pinker-global-poverty-neoliberalism-progress?fbclid=IwAR2HWSJ1Nd5rz3W9-_YWXX6jy0ErUXcXfAKT9m9GsdOPrwcH9-2LZ1x5OXE>) KVA

The point of my piece was that the story of global poverty is more complex than you and Gates have been willing to acknowledge, and the data do not support your narrative about neoliberal globalization. Let me elaborate on my key points here, to clear up any confusion, while also addressing your specific comments. First, the long-term poverty graph (1820 to present) developed by Max Roser and recently tweeted by Bill Gates is misleading and has little empirical legitimacy. There are a few reasons for this. Real data on poverty has only been collected since 1981, by the World Bank. It is widely accepted among those who research global poverty that any data prior to 1981 is simply too sketchy to be useful, and going back to as early as 1820 is more or less meaningless. The data for 1820–1970 comes from a source (Bourguignon and Morrisson 2002) that draws on the Maddison database on world GDP. That data was never intended to assess poverty, but rather the distribution of GDP — and that for only a limited range of countries. Data for the Global South is particularly thin, and there is very little that exists for prior to 1900. The data is not robust enough to draw meaningful conclusions about what was happening to people’s livelihoods during the colonial period. It is important to recognize that the graph mixes two very different measures. The measure for 1820–1970 is based on estimates of GDP per capita, with only rough guesses about household share, and takes little if any account of the goods and resources that people may have acquired from their land, from trees, from forests, from rivers and the sea, and in the form of gifts from relatives. We might try to speculate about the share of GDP that the poorest people had, but that’s very different from telling us anything very useful about poverty. By contrast, the World Bank’s measure is based on surveys that seek to assess household income and, wherever possible, consumption of all non-monetary goods. These two disparate measures cannot be united into a single long-term trend and cannot be used to draw confident conclusions. Roser’s graph might make for nice social media, but it’s not rooted in science. In fact, uniting the two methodologies is misleading in both directions. (1) By using GDP per capita from 1820–1970, it likely understates the resources that households had at their disposal in comparison to the representation of the later period, and (2) By including total consumption from 1981 onward it likely overstates people’s “income” in comparison to the representation of the earlier period. The only way to construct a legitimate long-term graph would be to use a single consistent indicator. While data on GDP per capita alone is not regarded as a robust way of assessing poverty, it is at least available (if too patchy to be useful) for the whole period. But in such a graph the falloff in poverty since 1981 would not be nearly as steep, as it would not count non-monetary transactions. Alternatively, we could wait until someone devises a reasonable method for measuring poverty in terms of household consumption since 1820. But in the meantime, I think it’s wise to refrain from making claims about long-term poverty trends that lack empirical validity. You say: “Hickel’s picture of the past is a romantic fairy tale, devoid of citations or evidence.” On the contrary, as the above makes clear, it is the graph of the past on which you so glibly rely that is devoid of meaningful evidence. As to my actual claims about the past, my argument was straightforward. I simply pointed out that we cannot ignore the fact that the period 1820 to circa 1950 was one of violent dispossession across much of the Global South. If you have read any colonial history, you will know colonizers had immense difficulty getting people to work on their mines and plantations. As it turns out, people tended to prefer their subsistence lifestyles, and wages were not high enough to induce them to leave. Colonizers had to coerce people into the labor market: imposing taxes, enclosing commons and constraining access to food, or just outright forcing people off their land. You ask for citations. Here are some you might try: Sven Beckert’s Empire of Cotton, Ellen Wood’s The Origin of Capitalism: A Longer View, Mike Davis’s Late Victorian Holocausts, Adam Hochschild’s King Leopold’s Ghost, and of course Karl Polanyi’s The Great Transformation. The process of forcibly integrating colonized peoples into the capitalist labor system caused widespread dislocation (a history I cover in The Divide). Remember, this is the period of the Belgian labor system in the Congo, which so upended local economies that 10 million people died — half the population. This is the period of the Natives Land Act in South Africa, which dispossessed the country’s black population of 90 percent of the country. This is the period of the famines in India, where 30 million died needlessly as a result of policies the British imposed on Indian agriculture. This is the period of the Opium Wars in China and the unequal treaties that immiserated the population. And don’t forget: all of this was conducted in the name of the “free market.” All of this violence, and much more, gets elided in your narrative and repackaged as a happy story of progress. And you say I’m the one possessed of romantic fairy tales. The Maddison database on which you rely might tell us what the dispossessed gained in GDP per capita (eventually), but it does not tell us whether those gains offset their loss of lands, commons, supportive communities, stable local economies. And it tells us nothing about what Global South economies might be like today had they been free to industrialize on their own terms (take the case of India, for instance). Let me be clear: this is not a critique of industrialization as such. It is a critique of how industrialization was carried out during the period in question. If people had willingly opted into the capitalist labor system, while retaining rights to their commons and while gaining a fair share of the yields they produced, we would have a very different story on our hands. So let’s celebrate what industrialization has achieved — absolutely — but place it in proper context: colonization, violence, dispossession, and all. All we gain from ignoring this history is ignorance. Now, to the present period. You say that the “massive fall of global extreme poverty” is simply a neutral fact of the data. But here again the data on this is more complex than you have ever acknowledged (I collaborated with Charles Kenny to review the basics here). The narrative that you and Gates peddle relies on a poverty line of $1.90 per day. You are aware, I’m sure, that this line is not a neutral phenomenon, handed down by the gods or given in nature. It was invented by people, is used for particular ends, and is hotly contested both inside and outside of academia. Most scholars regard $1.90 as far too low to be meaningful, for reasons I have outlined in my work many times (see here and here). See Reddy and Lahoti’s withering critique of the $1.90 methodology here. Here are a few points to keep in mind. Using the $1.90 line shows that only 700 million people live in poverty. But note that the UN’s Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) says that 815 million people do not have enough calories to sustain even “minimal” human activity. 1.5 billion are food insecure and do not have enough calories to sustain “normal” human activity. And 2.1 billion suffer from malnutrition. How can there be fewer poor people than hungry and malnourished people? If $1.90 is inadequate to achieve basic nutrition and sustain normal human activity, then it’s too low — period. It’s time for you and Gates to stop using it. Lifting people above this line doesn’t mean lifting them out of poverty, “extreme” or otherwise. Remember: $1.90 is the equivalent of what that amount of money could buy in the US in 2011. The economist David Woodward once calculated that to live at this level (in an earlier base year) would be like thirty-five people trying to survive in Britain “on a single minimum wage, with no benefits of any kind, no gifts, borrowing, scavenging, begging or savings to draw on (since these are all included as ‘income’ in poverty calculations).” That goes beyond any definition of “extreme.” It is patently absurd. It is an insult to humanity. In fact, even the World Bank has repeatedly stated that the line is too low to be used in any but the poorest countries, and should not be used to inform policy. In response to the Atkinson Report on Global Poverty, they created updated poverty lines for lower-middle-income ($3.20/day) and upper-middle-income ($5.50/day) countries. At those lines, some 2.4 billion people are in poverty today — more than three times higher than you would have people believe. But even these figures are not good enough. The USDA states that about $6.70/day is necessary for achieving basic nutrition. Peter Edwards argues that people need about $7.40 if they are to achieve normal human life expectancy. The New Economics Foundation concludes that around $8 is necessary to reduce infant mortality by a meaningful margin. Lant Pritchett and Charles Kenny have argued that since the poverty line is based on purchasing power in the US, then it should be linked to the US poverty line — so around $15/day. The literature on this issue is now vast and nuanced — I have only scratched the surface here — and yet you pretend it doesn’t even exist. That is intellectually irresponsible, and an inadequate approach to scholarship. You say: “The level at which one sets an arbitrary cutoff like ‘the poverty line’ is irrelevant — the entire distribution has shifted, so the trend is the same wherever you set it.” Not so fast. In fact, the story changes quite a bit — and you know it. If we use $7.40 per day, we see a decline in the proportion of people living in poverty, but it’s not nearly as dramatic as your rosy narrative would have it. In 1981 a staggering 71 percent lived in poverty. Today it hovers at 58 percent (for 2013, the most recent data). Suddenly your grand story of progress seems tepid, mediocre, and — in a world that’s as fabulously rich as ours — completely obscene. There is nothing worth celebrating about a world where inequality is so extreme that 58 percent of people are in poverty, while a few dozen billionaires have more than all of their wealth combined. That’s proportions. Don’t get me wrong: proportions are an important indicator — and we should pay attention to it. But absolute numbers are equally important. In fact, that is the metric that the world’s governments first agreed to target in the Rome Declaration in 1996, the precursor to the Millennium Development Goals. The goalposts were shifted to proportions in the following years, which created the impression of faster progress. But really now it’s a moot point: if the goal is to end poverty, what matters is absolute numbers. Certainly that’s what matters from the perspective of poor people themselves. And if we look at absolute numbers, the trend changes completely. The poverty rate has worsened dramatically since 1981, from 3.2 billion to 4.2 billion, according to World Bank data. Six times higher than you would have people believe. That’s not progress, in my book — that’s a disgrace. It is a crushing indictment of our global economic system, which is clearly failing the majority of humanity. Your claims about global poverty intentionally skate around this fact. Again, that is not responsible scholarship. But what’s really at stake here for you, as your letter reveals, is the free-market narrative that you have constructed. Your argument is that neoliberal capitalism is responsible for driving the most substantial gains against poverty. This claim is intellectually dishonest, and unsupported by facts. Here’s why. The vast majority of gains against poverty have happened in one region: East Asia. As it happens, the economic success of China and the East Asian tigers — as scholars like Ha-Joon Chang and Robert Wade have long pointed out — is due not to the neoliberal markets that you espouse but rather state-led industrial policy, protectionism, and regulation (the same measures that Western nations used to such great effect during their own period of industrial consolidation). They liberalized, to be sure — but they did so gradually and on their own terms. Not so for the rest of the Global South. Indeed, these policy options were systematically denied to them, and destroyed where they already existed. From 1980 to 2000, the International Monetary Fund and World Bank imposed brutal structural adjustment programs that did exactly the opposite: slashing tariffs, subsidies, social spending, and capital controls while reversing land reforms and privatizing public assets — all in the face of massive public resistance. During this period, the number of people in poverty outside China increased by 1.3 billion. In fact, even the proportion of people living in poverty (to use your preferred method) increased, from 62 percent to 68 percent. (For detailed economic data and references to the relevant literature, see Chapter 5 of The Divide.) In other words, the imposition of neoliberal capitalism from 1980 to 2000 made the poverty rate worse, not better. Since 2000, the most impressive gains against poverty (outside of East Asia) have come from Latin America, according to the World Bank, coinciding with a series of left-wing or social-democratic governments that came to power across the continent. Whatever one might say about these governments (I have my own critiques), this doesn’t sit very well with your neoliberal narrative. But there is something else that needs to be said here. You and Gates like to invoke the poverty numbers to make claims about the legitimacy of the existing global economic system. You say the system is working for the poor, so people should stop complaining about it. When it comes to assessing such a claim, it’s really neither absolute numbers nor proportions that matter. What matters, rather, is the extent of global poverty vis-à-vis our capacity to end it. As I have pointed out before, our capacity to end poverty (e.g., the cost of ending poverty as a proportion of the income of the non-poor) has increased many times faster than the proportional poverty rate has decreased (to use your preferred measure again). By this metric we are doing worse than ever before. Indeed, our civilization is regressing. Why? Because the vast majority of the yields of our global economy are being captured by the world’s rich. As I pointed out in the Guardian piece, only 5 percent of new income from global growth goes to the poorest 60 percent of humanity — people living on less than $7.40/day. You have neither acknowledged this as a problem nor attempted to defend it. Instead you just ignore it, I suppose because it undermines your claims about how well the economy is working for poor people. Here’s how well it’s working: on our existing trajectory, according to research published in the World Economic Review, it will take more than one hundred years to end poverty at $1.90/day and over two hundred years to end it at $7.40/day. Let that sink in. And to get there with the existing system — in other words, without a fairer distribution of income — we will have to grow the global economy to 175 times its present size. Even if such an outlandish feat were possible, it would drive climate change and ecological breakdown to the point of undermining any gains against poverty. It doesn’t have to be this way, of course. We can end poverty right now simply by making the rules of our global economy fairer for the world’s majority (I describe how we can do this in The Divide, looking at everything from wages to debt to trade). But that is an approach that you and Gates seem desperate to avoid, in favor of a blustering defense of the status quo. You say, “The drastic decline in extreme poverty is corroborated by measures of well-being other than income that are correlated with prosperity, such as longevity, child mortality, maternal mortality, literacy, basic education, undernourishment, consumption, etc.” Yes, life expectancy, mortality, and education have improved — this is fantastic news that we should celebrate! But, a few things: (1) You can’t make an argument about poverty by pointing to something else entirely. Consumption is increasing, yes. But that’s not what’s at stake here. What’s at stake is whether consumption is increasing enough to raise people out of poverty. (2) I’ll be the first to agree that income and consumption are not the only measures of well-being. But one reason they are absolutely crucial is because they allow us to assess inequality in the distribution of world resources. A higher life expectancy among the poor is no justification for condemning them to a tiny and ever-shrinking share of global income. That is not a morally defensible position. (3) In your work you have invoked gains in life expectancy and education as part of a narrative that seeks to justify neoliberal globalization. But here again that’s intellectually dishonest. What contributes most to improvements in life expectancy are in fact simple public health interventions (sanitation, antibiotics, vaccines), and what matters for education is, well, public education. Indeed, the countries that have been most successful at this are those that have robust, free health care and education. Don’t forget that the US has worse infant mortality than Cuba. (4) As for hunger, your claim here relies on a methodology used by the FAO after 2012 that has been widely criticized by scholars. The hunger-reduction narrative depends on a calorie line that — like your $1.90 poverty line — is too low to support normal human activity, ignores the impacts of food price crises, and tells us nothing about nutrient deficiencies. I cover this in detail in the second half of this paper. According to the FAO’s earlier methodology, both the number and proportion of people in hunger was higher in 2009 than in 1995 — another trend that you glibly ignore.

#### No empirical link between antitrust enforcement and inequality

Wright et al. 18 Wright: University Professor and Executive Director, Global Antitrust Institute at Scalia Law School; Jonathan Klick: Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania; Rybnicek: Senior Associate, Freshfields, Bruckahus Deringer LLP; Elyse Dorsey: Attorney Advisor to Commissioner Noah Phillips, United States Federal Trade Commission. The views expressed herein are our own and do not reflect the views of the Federal Trade Commission or any of its Commissioners. Jan M. Rybnicek “Requiem for a Paradox: The Dubious Rise and Inevitable Fall of Hipster Antitrust” https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=3249524

E. Is Lax Antitrust Causing Economic Inequality?123 The Hipster Antitrust movement has also attributed increasing economic inequality to a supposed trend of lax antitrust enforcement. Such weak application of the antitrust laws has allegedly allowed an abundance of anticompetitive mergers, monopolistic conduct, and other exclusionary and collusive behavior. In turn, that has contributed to the stratification of wealth toward the corporate shareholders and executives and away from lower socio-economic levels of society. Many proponents of the Hipster Antitrust movement have suggested that non-conduct specific factors such as implications of effects on economic inequality should be considered in antitrust analysis. For example, Lina Khan provides some observations of the potential redistributive effects of increasing concentration in emerging multi-sided platform markets.124 Khan suggests that Amazon’s market power, which she purports to be almost 50 percent of all ecommerce, allows the company to squeeze suppliers and potentially cause instability in the economy.125 Although it seems as though Amazon could benefit consumers by lowering prices, predatory pricing concerns loom large in her analysis. In a paper proffering similar arguments, Khan and Sandeep Vaheesan argue that market power contributes to economic inequality, economic power often translates into political power, the scope of the antitrust law became narrower during the Reagan Administration that permitted large corporations to dominate, and that antitrust laws can be utilized to fix economic inequality.126 Concerns about inequality have prompted policy suggestions across a multitude of policy areas.127 In these discussions, adjustments to antitrust policy have been raised as a mode to combat increasing economic inequality. Even though explicit goals aimed at economic redistribution have not been a primary motivation in the development of U.S. competition law, there is some evidence that distributional concerns play a role in antitrust analysis. For example, the Horizontal Merger Guidelines explain that the antitrust agencies are willing to give weight to arguments provided by merging parties that a merger will reduce costs and result in higher output only to the extent those gains are passed on to final consumers and result in an increase in producer surplus.128 As opposed to competition law in many other countries, a non-existent institutional preference for more firms as opposed to fewer does imply that distribution among producers is not among the concerns in U.S. antitrust law. Indeed, antitrust’s history includes a significant period of time in which the goals of the enterprise were considered significantly broader than economic welfare, including protection of “small dealers and worthy men,” and expressed an explicit preference for smaller firms.129 Critics of the current welfare-based approach to antitrust law are calling for antitrust to return to this earlier era and explicitly take into account distributional concerns.130 1. Explicit and Implicit Empirical Claims About Antitrust and Inequality Even though the relationship between antitrust enforcement and increasing economic inequality has not been definitively established, a number of economics and legal scholars have pointed to increased antitrust enforcement as a way to ameliorate increasing economic inequality. For example, Jonathan Baker writes, “[t]he exercise of market power also probably contributes to economy-wide inequality because the returns from market power go disproportionately to the wealthy. Increases in producer surplus from the exercise of market power (the wealth transfer) accrue primarily to a firm’s shareholders and its top executives, who are wealthier on average than the median consumer. In a recent year, the top 1 percent of the wealth distribution held half of stock and mutual fund assets, and the top 10 percent held more than 90 percent of those assets. Unionized workers in the past may have been able to appropriate some of the profits from the exercise of market power, but with the decline of private-sector unionization, this possibility now has limited practical importance.”131 Baker overstates his empirical case somewhat with respect to the effects of increased market power on wealth inequality because the empirical results he cites carve out pension and retirement accounts (which presumably benefit from increased firm profits) and life insurance (the value of which will improve as investment performance improves, at least in the case of whole life insurance). These excluded categories are more broadly held than stock and non-retirement mutual fund assets. Nevertheless, Baker’s argument largely stands, though his assertion that increased antitrust enforcement would combat increasing economic inequality is asserted without any empirical support. At a minimum, for example, Baker’s point relies on the Panglossian assumption that antitrust enforcement is accurately targeted at firms with market power, which is a questionable assumption. **There is significant historical evidence that antitrust enforcement in practice includes false positives** – that is, enforcement resulting in prohibiting conduct that does not involve the anticompetitive exercise or acquisition of market power.132 Antitrust enforcement can also be used as a tool by firms with market power to entrench it by disadvantaging rivals.133 As discussed, Furman & Orszag take a more empirical approach, arguing that “a rising share of firms are earning super-normal returns on capital…workers at those firms are both producing and sharing in those super-normal returns, driving up wage inequality…the high returns to labor and capital at those firms reduces labor mobility by discouraging workers from leaving firms that earn higher rents.”134 In support, Furman & Orszag provide evidence that returns of S&P 500 firms have become more skewed over time. Furman & Orszag also outline that the return on invested capital has also become highly skewed at least since the 1990s. While such evidence suggests some implications, there is no implication of antitrust concerns because these results could be indicative of firms engaging in greater risk-taking or the presence of superior products.135 Furman & Orszag use metrics that bear little resemblance to actual antitrust markets, and do not provide any evidence that increases in antitrust enforcement would actually reduce these metrics, much less have any discernable effect on levels of economic inequality. Marc Jarsulic et al. also point out that income inequality is rising. They argue that firms with “dominant market power” raise prices and earn supra-normal economic rents while simultaneously lower the real incomes of consumers.136 Jarsulic et al. argue that rent extraction in the U.S. economy is on the rise because of “unchallenged market power.”137 Jarsulic et al. outline other undesirable results, including higher barriers to entry for new firms, stifled innovation, degraded product quality, reduced prices paid to workers and suppliers, and increased influence with government officials.138 To reverse these effects, the authors argue that the antitrust laws can be employed, but have not been deployed vigorously enough over the last few decades. Sean F. Ennis, Pedro Gonzaga, and Chris Pike take a calibration approach to examine the effect of increasing concentration on inequality.139 Their calibration model makes the following assumptions: 1) “Market power for each country can be approximated by the difference between the average mark-up (across all sectors) in the country and a minimum mark-up that reflects the best-practices of most competitive economies”; (2) “The marginal propensity to save from increased income arising from lower prices is constant across wealth groups.”140 The authors assert that “this assumption simplifies the solution to the model, but does not prevent the average saving rate from varying across wealth groups”; (3) “Market power gains are distributed in proportion to the current net wealth distribution.” According to Ennis et al., “this reflects the observations that corporate income and capital gains are distributed via business ownership, so that those with the largest wealth shares…will, in proportion, receive the largest share of the profits”; and (4) “The price of different baskets of goods will be inflated by market power in an equal percentage.”141 According to the authors, “this implies that product for the poor and products for the wealthy will be equally affected by market power. To the extent that the poor are more exposed to monopolization, the model provides conservative, lower-bound estimates.”142 Based on their study, Ennis et al., conclude that market power may contribute significantly to economic inequality; “violations of competition law, government-created barriers to entry or natural monopolies may be significant sources of market power”; the authors “do not suggest that competition law and policy should specifically target inequality” instead they “suggest that reduced inequality is a beneficial by-product of government actions and policies to reduce illegitimate market power.”143 Although these commentators uniformly suggest that increased antitrust enforcement could have beneficial effects on inequality, **none directly examine this proposition using empirical data**. The underlying economic logic of the claims that lax antitrust has resulted in increased inequality is fairly simple. In the absence of antitrust enforcement, firms gain market power, reduce output, raise prices, and generate monopoly profits, which enrich shareholders. Because shareholders tend to live in the top end of the wealth and income distributions, inequality increases. Further, because of rising prices, those in the lower end of the distributions (where a greater fraction of income and wealth are devoted to consumption) are made relatively worse off, increasing welfare inequality as well. The question is whether this simple account of the problem is correct. **There is little systematic empirical evidence of a link between antitrust enforcement and inequality**. Below are some preliminary empirical analyses of the effect of antitrust enforcement on measures of inequality. Regardless of whether we examine income, wealth, or (in our view, the more relevant) consumption distribution, there is no evidence that metrics of enforcement are related to inequality. While these results do not guarantee that increased antitrust enforcement could not affect inequality, they do suggest that proposals for increased enforcement to address inequality concerns are premature and potentially misguided.

#### Wealth concentration – newest Census data goes neg

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**Newly released data** on concentration ratios from the U.S. Census Bureau’s 2017 Economic Census provides a way to assess claims about increasing concentration by comparing it to 2002 data. The U.S. Census Bureau released the concentration of largest firms for 2017 on December 3, 2020.2 **The data largely rebuts these claims**: Just 35 of 851 industries (4 percent) were highly concentrated, with the top-4 firms (the C4 concentration ratio) holding more than 80 percent of the market. In 2017, 80 percent of U.S. business output was from industries with low levels of concentration, with that share increasing from 62 percent in 2002. Fifty-five percent of industries increased concentration between 2002 and 2017; 45 percent decreased. The average C4 ratio increased by just 1 percentage point between 2002 and 2017, from 34.3 percent to 35.3 percent, while the average C8 ratio increased even less, from 44.1 percent to 44.7 percent. There was a slight negative correlation between the C4 level in 2002 and the percentage point change in C4 between 2002 and 2017. Among the industries with increases in concentration, only one-third increased by greater than 10 percentage points. Of the 20 industries showing the greatest increase in the C4 ratio from 2002 to 2017, only 30 percent had C4 ratios above 80 percent in 2017. Of the 115 industries with a C4 ratio of 60 percent or more in 2002, the majority got less concentrated, with the average C4 declining 4 percentage points. For every advanced technology industry with a C4 ratio over 80 percent, there were 10 with a C4 ratio below 50 percent. Producer prices rose less from 2002 to 2017 in industries with higher levels of concentration than overall prices. In short, to paraphrase Mark Twain, the reports of the death of competition are greatly exaggerated. THE NEW TRUISM: MONOPOLY IS RAMPANT The “fact” of rising concentration, and even monopoly, has been picked up and commented on by a larger number of pundits and commentators. Brookings’ analyst David Wessel wrote, “There’s no question that most industries are becoming more concentrated. Big firms account for higher shares of industry revenue and are reaping historically large profits relative to their investment.”3The Economist concluded that two-thirds of the economy’s roughly 900 industries had become more concentrated between 1997 and 2012.4 Former chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors Jason Furman testified that market concentration has increased since 1997.5 Paul Krugman wrote that “growing monopoly power is a big problem for the U.S. economy.”6 New York Times columnist Eduardo Porter stated, “There is plenty of evidence that corporate concentration is on the rise.”7 Economist Joe Stiglitz wrote that a “deeper and more fundamental problem is the growing [concentration of market power](https://www.project-syndicate.org/onpoint/disruption-concentration-and-the-new-economy-by-raghuram-rajan-2019-01).”8 The neo-Brandeisian advocacy group Open Markets has referred to “America’s concentration crisis.”9 And the Center for American Progress has written about “America’s monopoly problem.”10 These claims have motivated hearings and potential legislation to reform antitrust. Senator Amy Klobuchar (D-MN), chairwoman of the Senate Subcommittee on Competition Policy, Antitrust, and Consumer Rights, wrote, “We are seeing higher levels of market concentration across our economy, partially driven by waves of corporate consolidation.”11 Congressman David Cicilline (D-RI), chairman of the House Antitrust Subcommittee, has warned that America has a “monopoly problem.”12 Lina Khan, who has been nominated by the Biden Administration to serve as an FTC commissioner, has alleged that the United States faces a “sweeping market power problem” as a result of relaxing antitrust law.13 It has become an article of faith that concentration has increased to problematic levels and that this supports wholesale and even radical changes in U.S. antitrust policy. The Biden-Sanders unity task force released a list of recommendations in August 2020. They proposed a “Tackling Runaway Corporate Concentration,” which emphasized, Democrats are concerned about the increase in mega-mergers and corporate concentration across a wide range of industries, from hospitals and pharmaceutical companies to agribusiness and retail chains. We will direct federal regulators to review a subset of the mergers and acquisitions that have taken place since President Trump took office, prioritizing the pharmaceutical, health care, and agricultural industries, to assess whether any have increased market concentration, raised consumer prices, demonstrably harmed workers, increased racial inequality, or reduced competition, and assign appropriate remedies. Democrats will direct regulators to consider potential effects of future mergers on the labor market, on low-income and racially marginalized communities, and on racial equity. And as a last resort, regulators should consider breaking up corporations if they find they are using their market power to engage in anti-competitive activities.14 In other words, it has become an article of faith that concentration has increased to problematic levels and that this supports wholesale and even radical changes in U.S. antitrust policy. Former member of the Council of Economic Advisors under President Obama, Carl Shapiro, summed up this view in 2017: Somehow, over the past two years, the notion that there has been a substantial and widespread decline in competition throughout the American economy has taken root in the popular press. In some circles, this is now the conventional wisdom, the starting point for policy analysis rather than a bold hypothesis that needs to be tested.15 This report tests that hypothesis with Census Bureau data. CENSUS BUREAU CONCENTRATION DATA One way to test this hypothesis is with data. Some scholars have tried to evaluate whether concentration has risen.16 However, antitrust experts question the basics from many of these analyses, because definitions of the relevant market are debatable.17 To be fair, it is difficult to measure market power. Competition can differ at national and local levels.18 Imports have to be considered, which will lower measured concentration in many traded sectors. Potential entry, including from disruptive technologies, also needs to be factored in. And firms can compete with each other even if they are in different industries as defined by the federal government. As such, antitrust law has stressed for the last 40 years that concentration ratios (the share of sales in a particular industry accounted for by a certain number of firms) can never substitute for the detailed economic analysis of specific markets.19 Nonetheless, concentration ratios are a foundational set of data that can be used to look at the overall economy-wide state of and change in concentration and competition. The most common measure is from the U.S. Census Bureau, which as part of its quinquennial economic census releases sales data for the 6-digit NAICS industries (e.g., NAICS code 332913 Residential electric lighting fixture manufacturing) consisting of over 850 industries and details the share of sales of firms accounted for by the top 4, 8, 20, and 50 firms in the industry (known as the C4, C8, C20, etc. ratio). Our choice of granular industry classification (6-digit NAICS industries) is not random. **The more detailed the industry classification for market power analysis, the bette**r. For example, **using 3-digit or 4-digit** NAICS **codes**, which many have done, **is questionable**, as it is difficult to argue that a toaster (NAICS code 335210 Small Electrical Appliance Manufacturing) competes with an oven (NAICS 335220 Major Household Appliance Manufacturing), since both goods are classified in the same 4-digit NAICS code (3352 Household Appliance Manufacturing). Examples of 4-digit versus 6-digit NAICS codes are abundant (e.g., NAICS 333241 Food Product Machinery Manufacturing and 333242 Semiconductor Machinery Manufacturing are both in 3332 Industrial Machinery Manufacturing). Analyzing at the 3-digit level of NAICS code is even more problematic, as it is not imaginable that Animal Food Manufacturing (NAICS code 3111) competes with Dairy Product Manufacturing (NAICS 3115) if the relevant market considered is Food Manufacturing (NAICS 311). Another challenge to an accurate assessment is what to measure, or absolute share numbers of change. Those that claim that monopoly (a misused term, since it implies one firm controls virtually all of a given market) has become a problem simply measure the number of industries with rising concentration. Take an industry wherein the C4 ratio in the base year is 8 percent (each of the top 4 firms has an average of 2 percent of the market). In the most current year, it rises to 12 percent. Now, while the industry has become more concentrated, the top 4 firms average just 3 percent of the market—**far from market power.** Yet, those who want to paint a story of a dangerous growth in monopoly do not bother to mention that increases from a low level to another low level are meaningless from a concentration perspective. For instance, Grullon et al. cited the rise of concentration in Furniture and Home Furnishings retailers (NAICS code 442) within the four largest players as an alarming warning because their share increased 200 percent from 1997 to 2012, yet the concentration went from 6.5 percent to just 19.4 percent.20 In other words, on average, the top four firms had less than 5 percent of the market each. **The real issue is not whether industries are becoming more concentrated; it is whether industries are moving from being unconcentrated to concentrated.** Comparing sectors in one period to the next using Census data requires harmonizing the 6-digit NAICS codes over time, as there is always a change in the classification from one Census to another. Using the concordance available at the U.S. Census Bureau between two immediate Census years, the Information Technology and Information Foundation (ITIF) created a concordance between 2002 and 2017. For example, the industry classification for Internet Publishing and Broadcasting and Web Search Portals (NAICS code 519130) in 2017 included two industries considered in 2002: Internet Publishing and Broadcasting (NAICS code 516110) and Web Search Portals (NAICS code 518112). To combine these two industries in 2002 into one, ITIF used the weighted average of the concentration ratio using total revenue. An additional challenge is that while Census includes all domestic producers, it does not include imports, which take market share from domestic producers. This overstates concentration ratios in most traded goods and services markets and likely overstates the growth because the share of gross domestic product (GDP) imports grew from 13 percent in 2002 to 15 percent in 2017.21 For example, Covarrubias et al. found that the weighted average C8 ratio for high-import manufacturing industries rose by 6.7 percentage points from 1997 to 2012. However, adjusting for imports reduces the rise to just 1.6 percentage points.22 ITIF examined C4 concentration ratios for 2002 and 2017 at the most detailed 6-digit NAICS code level. A C4 concentration ratio of 50 percent, for example, would mean that the top four firms hold an average of 12.5 percent of the market each. While there is no hard-and-fast definition, generally C4 ratios above 80 percent are considered high in concentration, ratios of 50 to 80 percent medium, and below 50 percent low.23 Census collects and reports data on 851 industries for both years. Some industries, such as Construction and Mining, are not listed in one year but are in the other. Some industries do not have sales data because Census does not want to divulge proprietary information.24 Nevertheless, industries covered in this report represent more than 90 percent of the total private sector output in the United States.25 Concentration in 2017 In 2017, 643 industries (76 percent) were unconcentrated with less than a 50 percent C4 ratio (see figure 1). A total of 173 (20 percent) were moderately concentrated with a C4 ratio between 50 percent and 80 percent. **And just** 35 industries (**4 percent) were highly concentrated** with a C4 ratio of 80 percent or more. Even at 80 percent, this means the top four firms had only 20 percent of the market share if they split it into equal shares. Figure 1: Count of C4 concentration in 2017 NAICS codes26 Changes in Concentration: 2002–2017 **On average, concentration increased only 1 percentage point between 2002 and 2017** after taking the simple average across all industries of the differences between C4 from both years (34.3 percent in C4 from 2002 and 35.3 percent in C4 from 2017). Given that industries with C4 ratios below 50 percent are considered unconcentrated, this is a very low number. **The concentration of the eight largest firms (C8) increased even less, from 44.1 to 44.7 percent**. Even considering the eight largest firms, the concentration ratio remained lower than 50 percent. Overall, 467 sectors (**55 percent**) **increased in concentration**, **while** 384 (**45 percent) decreased** (see figure 2). Again, this is hardly evidence of widespread growth of monopoly. Moreover, **among** the sectors that saw an **increase**, **only** 152 (**18 percent of the total) increased by more than 10 percentage points.** [Table Omitted] Another way to assess trends in concentration is by looking at whether the increases in C4 ratio were mostly in industries with already high C4 ratios in 2002. In other words, did the concentrated get even more concentrated? Figure 3 presents this relationship, with the y-axis showing the percentage-point change in the C4 from 2002 to 2017, and the x-axis presenting the level of C4 in 2002. The trend line is negative (correlation coefficient of -0.23), indicating that, **on average, more concentrated industries got less concentrated from 2002 to 2017**. Even the outliers with higher C4 increases were in industries with lower levels of concentration in 2002. With these two outliers removed, the relationship is still negative at the same magnitude (-0.23). [Table Omitted] If policymakers are concerned about the growth of market power, as opposed to simply the growth in concentration, the key is to examine industries exhibiting higher concentration ratios; in this case, with C4 ratios of 60 percent or higher. **Only** 94 industries (**11 percent) saw an increase in concentration that produced a C4 of 60 percent or more** (and even at 60 percent, if each firm held an equal market share, this would mean that each firm had just 15 percent of the market). Looking at the 115 industries that had a C4 ratio of at least 60 percent in 2002, 55 percent saw a reduction in concentration ratio (see figure 4). On average, **these industries saw a decline of 4 percentage points in their C4 ratio.** Thirty-nine industries experienced a reduction of 10 percent or more, and 24 saw a decline of more than 0 percent to 10 percent. In contrast, only 13 percent of the industries showed an increase of more than 10 percentage points. **In other words, more sectors with higher C4 ratios in 2002 lost market share than sectors that gained.** [Table Omitted] Highly Concentrated Industries Some industries clearly got less concentrated, while others got more. Table 1 shows the 20 industries with the greatest increases in C4 ratio. Only 30 percent had C4 ratios above 80 percent in 2017. And even for some of them, there was little risk of firms exerting much market power. For example, industries such as other performing arts companies, luggage and leather goods stores, geothermal power generation, and paint and wallpaper stores all face significant competition from firms in other industries such as movie theaters, department stores, and natural gas power generation. For some other industries, the U.S. trade balance deteriorated, meaning that imports took a larger share and provided more competition.30 This includes newsprint and electrical lighting manufacturing, in which the United States is the largest importer (importing 20 percent of the total international trade for both industries).31 For other industries, such as taxi service and travel agencies, the Internet enabled significant economies of scale and cost reductions, such as with the rise of Uber and Lift for taxis and Travelocity and Expedia for travel. Finally, in a number of industries, technology has created new competitors for these industries. Over-the-air radio stations now compete with satellite radio and smartphones. The dramatic improvement of digital cameras has reduced the market for photofinishing laboratories, likely having caused consolidation as the market shrank. [Table Omitted] Table 2 lists the 20 industries with the highest concentration ratios in 2017. Fourteen were highly concentrated in 2002, with six joining them by 2017. And of the industries with a C4 ratio above 80 percent, many of them were naturally concentrated. For example, it’s hard to imagine why it would be more optimal for the guided missile and space vehicle industry, computer storage device manufacturing, or aircraft manufacturing to be less concentrated because of the enormous investments needed in research and development (R&D) and production to be successful. Others, such as HMO medical centers and warehouse clubs, and home centers, may be concentrated, but faced competition from other industries (doctors’ offices and other retailers, respectively). Other industries on the list faced technological competition. Passenger car rental faced competition from ride-sharing and also from personal rental companies such as Zip Car. [Table Omitted] Advanced Technology Industries Anti-corporate populists have taken particular aim at technology sectors, claiming that **“Big Tech,”** particularly the Internet industry, is concentrated. However, the number of advanced technology industries with high levels of concentration is modest (see figure 5). Using the Brookings Institution list of 4-digit NAICS code of advanced technology industries, ITIF constructed a list of advanced technology industries at the 6-digit NAICS code level.34 Of 135 industries, only 8 have C4 ratios above 80 and 10 times more have C4 ratios below 50. **Moreover, there were more unconcentrated tech sectors in 2017 than in 2002.** The argument that tech sectors are becoming concentrated does not hold. [Table Omitted] Selected industries, media, and pundits have singled out a number of industries for scrutiny for excess concentration. Table 3 lists some of these industries. In reality, the C4 ratio fell in some, including in automobiles, biotech drugs, computers, and semiconductors in manufacturing; and cable programming, other motion pictures, and software in services. Some industries, such as motion picture and video distribution and sound recording studios did see increased market share, albeit from low levels to still-low levels. For example, even with the rise of Amazon, the C4 ratio of electronic shopping and mail-order houses increased from 24 percent to just 37 percent. The C4 ratio for some industries did increase, but by modest amounts, such as for wired telecommunication carriers (58 to 64 percent) and music publishers (55 to 57 percent). Or they increased to modest levels: pharmaceuticals from 36 to 44 percent and hardware stores from 13 percent to 31 percent. The Internet publishing and broadcasting and web search portals industry did increase, but only to 54 percent. Assuming an equal division of the market, the four largest firms would have had just 13.5 percent of the market. And even in some industries wherein concentration increased and other industries provide little competition, such as scheduled passenger air transportation, the increase in concentration was beneficial. From 1995 to 2016, airline productivity grew four times faster than the overall U.S. economy, and prices rose one-third as fast as the rate of inflation. Investment in capital equipment went up faster than the U.S. average, and profits were below the overall U.S. corporate average.36 Likewise, the C4 ratio in the wireless telecommunications industry increased 63 percent to 86 percent. But this has does not appear to have come at the expense of consumer or overall economic welfare. Productivity in the sector grew 84 percent faster than overall non-farm business productivity.37 The productivity growth rate after the year 2000, when concentration was increasing, was more than three times faster than in the 13 years prior.38 Moreover, capital investment doubled in inflation-adjusted terms.39 And according to Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) data, nominal prices fell by 31 percent from 2011 to 2020.40 Finally, the C4 ratio in the taxi industry increased significantly to relatively high levels, from 18 to 77 percent, but this was presumably because of the entry of car-sharing companies such as Uber and Lyft, where the entry has increased service and held down prices, which led to consumer surplus of $6.8 billion just for all American UberX users in 2015.41 [Table Omitted] Share of Business Output It’s not enough to analyze individual sectors. It is important to also analyze the sectors as a share of the overall economy. To be sure, some sectors are more concentrated. But a key question is what share of the economy these increasing concentration sectors constitute. Figure 6 shows the percentage of sectors with low, medium, and high C4 in business output in 2002 and 2017.43 **Sectors with a low concentration ratio, below 50 percent, had a much higher share in business output than medium** (50–80 percent) **and high** (over 80 percent). Furthermore, low concentration industries became a larger share of the economy. While the low concentration sectors constituted 62 percent of the economy in 2002, by 2017, their share had grown to more than 80 percent. Inverse patterns occurred in medium and high levels of concentration. The share of economic output from highly concentrated industries fell from 10.6 percent in 2002 to 4.7 percent in 2017. In short, the U.S. economy is not becoming monopolistic, filled with giant rapacious firms gobbling up market share. Most of the economy is unconcentrated, and that share has been increasing. But surely the firms in the few concentrated industries must be making rapacious profits. It is to that we now turn. Concentration and Prices Surely concentration must enable firms to charge higher prices. In fact, **of the 36 industries with a C4 ratio of over 70 percent** in 2017, and for which there was data available on price changes from the BLS producer price index (PPI), 22 (**61 percent) saw price increases** from 2002 to 2017 that were **lower than the economy-wide PPI**. In fact, the correlation between the C4 ratio and the change in PPI was actually negative (-0.31), meaning the more concentrated the industry, the lower the price increase. Concentration and Profitability Surely concentration must enable the firms to earn higher profits. To assess this, ITIF combined aggregated profit data from the Corporation Complete Reports from the Internal Revenue Service with the Census C4 data at 3-digit NAICs code, as this was the level of aggregation in the IRS data set.45 ITIF was able to get data on profits and concentrations for 80 industries.46 ITIF used the measure of the ratio of net income over total receipts for profits. There is essentially no relationship between industry profitability and the concentration ratio in 2017 (a correlation coefficient of 0.04). [Table Omitted]

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#### Justification of antitrust policy precedes political motivations

**Rahman 20** (Sabel Rahman Law @ Brooklyn “Structuralist Regulation” Prepared for NYU Law School Public Law Colloquium, September 2020)

The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Part I provides a conceptualization of ‘structuralist’ policymaking, identifying the underlying assumptions that animate structuralism as a regulatory strategy. This Part also notes that this concept of regulatory strategy (or what I call “regulatory logic”, as defined below) should be understood as a distinct way of unpacking and analyzing the patterns of policymaking judgment distinct from other modes of analysis like cost-benefit analysis or the rules-versus-standards debate. Part II then looks at examples of structuralist policy proposals in recent economic policy debates: the debate over tech platforms, the debate over too-big-to-fail financial firms and systemic risk, and **the renewed interest in anti-trust** and anti-monopoly law. These examples help illustrate structuralist regulatory logics in action, and their distinctive assumptions and potential benefits over more conventional regulatory approaches. The purpose of this Part is not to offer a full-throated defense of structuralist policies in each of these sectors (although I am perhaps unsurprisingly sympathetic to the arguments on the merits); rather the purpose here is simply to illustrate structuralism as a distinct mode of thinking about policymaking. Part III articulates some broader implications for how to implement and institutionalize structuralist policies. Part IV concludes with some closing thoughts on how structuralism as a way of thinking about regulation connects to this broader moment of intense political and scholarly interest in inequality and racial (in)justice.

I. Structure as regulatory subject and strategy

Regulatory logics

The task of creating an effective and responsive regulatory system is often thought of in terms of questions of institutional design the balance of responsibilities between legislatures, agencies, and judges; how agencies should be structured; how agency heads should be appointed; how agencies can generate sufficient expertise to regulate effectively without falling prey to industry capture. But part of the challenge in **ensuring** effective and responsive **regulation lies within the ways in which regulators and policymakers more broadly think about their task**—**the concepts and worldviews** **that operate within the ‘black box’ of policy decisionmaking and judgment.**

However stringently we might read the external legal constraints on regulatory action— whether through judicial review or command—the fact of regulator discretion and judgment is inescapable.25 So how then should we think about the analytical methods or frameworks employed by regulators themselves? Regulators and legislators are not merely technical automatons executing the public will or legislative command. Nor are they simply political ideologues. Rather, **policymakers are necessarily making decisions that involve degrees of subjective, normative, and policy judgments**. **The ways in which that judgment is exercised has an impact on the dynamics of regulatory policy**.

**Embedded in these judgments are a range of assumptions, values, and concerns. How are policymakers understanding the purposes of regulation in a given domain**? Do they see their enterprise as complementary to existing private parties and practices? Or as fundamentally critical and oppositional? How do regulators view their own capacities and institutional competency—particularly relative to other private or governmental actors? Do they see themselves as outgunned and undermanned? Or well-informed and capable? **What is their analysis of the systems and causes that drive the problems they are trying to solve**—and which of those causes are, in their view, most amenable to the tools they have on hand? **These are the kinds of underlying questions that operate upstream from a discrete policy issue or costbenefit analysis inquiry.**

These questions often aggregate into distinctive patterns of judgment, consistent regulatory strategies, or what I call in this paper “regulatory logics”. Re**gulatory logics live squarely in the midst of the black box of regulatory judgment;** **they** are more reasoned and grounded in understandings of the empirical nature of the world than pure political ideology, but at the same time they also **share some degree of normative, subjective judgment beyond merely technical calculations of risk, costs, and benefits**. **We can think of “regulatory logics” as analogous to canons and methods of statutory interpretation in the judiciary**. Just as **canons offer a conceptual framework** **and method of reasoning for judges** seeking to fill in the gaps between statutory text and a new fact situation, **regulatory logics can be thought of as a bundle of presumptions about the social goals of regulation**, about the relative institutional competency of regulators in comparison to private actors, **and about the appropriate methods of analysis** required in formulating rules responding to new circumstances. And, like modes of interpretive reasoning, regulatory logics do not predetermine a specific outcome—though they may shade in some directions making some policy determinations and outcomes more likely than others. Nor are the same logics necessarily appropriate in all circumstances; different conditions may demand different regulatory logics.

#### No link defense

**Espiritu 93** (Yen Le, Espiritu, Distinguished Professor of Ethnic Studies at UC San Diego, “Asian American Panethnicity,” 1993, Temple University Press)

Asian Lumping It is difficult to trace the etiology of any racial incident. Motives are often mixed, so economically motivated acts may also carry a racist message and vice versa (Light 198 Y 354-355). For the purpose of this chapter, it is not necessary to choose between class-based and race-based explanations of anti-Asianism. What is Important is to recognize that, whatever the cause, **hostilities directed at any of the Asian subgroups tend to affect the others as well**. **All Asians are at risk because outsiders perceive them as a single group. Because outsiders do not or cannot distinguish among Asian subgroups, they target all Asians for their "message of hate**" 3 **or punish one group for another's behavior.** They also fail to distinguish recent immigrants and refugees from third- or fourth-generation citizens (Allen 1983 : 62; U.S. Commission on Civil Rights 1986: 2-3; Harrison 198]: 16). Worse yet, **non-Asians seldom distinguish Asian Americans from Asian nationals**. **In public discourse, victims of antiAsian incidents are often referred to as foreign nationals when, in fact, they are American citizens** (Japanese American Citizen League 198]: 69). In a testimony submitted to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, U.S. Representative Matsui (1984: 64) contended that **the difference between Asian nations and Americans of Asian ancestry becomes so blurred that Asian Americans are the scapegoats to foreign industries.**" **This misconception is reflected in the recurrent blaming of Japanese Americans for the bombing of Pearl Harbor** and for the trade imbalance with Japan. Along the same lines, **those who resent Asian entrepreneurs often confuse small-scale Asian American businesses with high-profile investment projects funded largely with overseas Asian capital** (Fong 1987). More than any other incident, **the beating death of Vincent Chin epitomizes the racism of Asian lumping: blamed for Japan's economic advantage, a Chinese American, mistaken for Japanese, was murdered.** On the night of 19 June 1982, **Vincent Chin**, a twenty-seven year-old Chinese American draftsman, stopped in a Detroit bar with three friends to celebrate Chin's upcoming wedding. While in the bar, Chin **became involved in a fist fight with Ronald Ebens, a white Chrysler factory foreman.** The dispute continued into the parking lot, where Ebens pulled a baseball bat from his car. Chin and his friends fled. For the next half-hour, **Ebens and his stepson, Michael Nitz, allegedly stalked Chin, eventually locating him in front of a fast food restaurant. There, while Nitz grabbed Chin from behind, Ebens struck at least four blows to Chin's head.** The Highland Park police arrested Ebens and Nitz at the scene. **Chin died four days later from severe head injuries. Instead of celebrating Chin's wedding, his guests attended his funeral** (American Citizens for Justice 1983a; Beer 1983; Weingarten 1983). In filing charges, the Wayne County prosecutor opted for second degree murder-homicide with no premeditation. In a later plea bargain, Ebens pleaded guilty to manslaughter (a lesser charge); Nitz did not contest his charge (Zia 1984a). **Although a manslaughter conviction in Michigan carries a maximum sentence of fifteen years in prison, Wayne County Judge Charles Kaufman imposed no prison time on Ebens and Nitz**. Instead**, he sentenced both to three years' probation and fined each a mere $ 3,000** (American Citizens for Justice 1983a; Kaufman 1983).4 In explaining his lenient sentence, Judge **Kaufman cited** the defendants' stable working backgrounds and lack of criminal records: "**You don't make the punishment fit the crime; you make the punishment fit the criminal"** (cited in American Citizens for Justice 1983a). Although shocked by Chin's brutal death, Detroit's Asian American community did not immediately respond to the killing. They fully expected the court to punish the killers. **When the court did not, the outraged and disbelieving community quickly formed American Citizens for Justice (ACT) to seek prosecution of Chin's killers.** Kaufman's lenient sentence also outraged Asian Americans across the country, who read in it an official condonation of anti-Asian violence. Letters of protest streamed into Kaufman's office from as far away as New York and San Francisco (Beer 1983). Kaufman's decision also received extensive and bitter media coverage. 5 "The headlines can only be described as scathing. One large cartoon . .. even showed the trial judge putting a baseball bat in one ear, as if it were a pencil, and sharpening it with a pencil sharpener m the opposite ear" (U.S. Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit 1986: 1426). In June 1983, a year after Chin's death, Kaufman announced that he would not reverse his sentence (Weingarten 1983). Initially, ACT did not call the killing a racial attack. Its focus of protest was Kaufman's lenient sentence. But as ACT's members reconstructed the events of that evening, they became convinced that the slaying had been racially motivated. Three eyewitnesses stated that Ebens directed racial slurs at Chen. One witness recalled hearing, "Because of you .. . we're out of work" (U.S. Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit 1986).6 It was this testimony that gripped the nation**. It implied that Chin's killers mistook him for Japanese and blamed him for the layoffs in the automobile industry** (Zia 1 984a: 18). In 1980, Detroit City had one of the highest unemployment rates in the country, 18.5 percent compared to the national average of 5.8 percent (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1983a: table 120 and 1983b: table 124). In this Motor City, where one in three auto workers had lost his or her job in the five preceding years, Japanese imports-almost a quarter of the market-took the blame (Weingarten 1983 : 12i Nanto 1985). A recent film documentary on the Chin case showed Detroit in deep recession with long unemployment lines and closed car plants (Tajima and Choy 1988). **At the United Auto Workers headquarters, a red and white sign summed up anti-Japanese sentiments: "300,000 laid-off UAW members don't like your import. Please park it in Tokyo"** (Weingarten 1983). Numerous videocasts showed auto workers and others in Detroit attacking Japanese-made automobiles with sledgehammers (U.S. Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit 1986: 1439). **Calling for a new U.S. industrial policy that would limit imports, a Michigan congressman labeled Japanese trade practices "an economic Pearl Harbor" and another referred to Japanese workers as "little yellow people"** (Smollar 1983). The linkage between Chin's death and anti-Japanese sentiment became the hallmark of the case.7 Because of the racial overtones, ACT petitioned the U.S. Justice Department to bring civil rights charges against Chin's killers. Responding to heavy public pressure, the Justice Department ordered an FBI investigation of Chin's death for possible civil rights violations (American Citizens for Justice I983b). **Applying additional pressure, California Congressman Norman Mineta wrote the US. attorney general urging him to act on the Chin case** (Rafu Shimpo I983). **In November I983, a federal grand jury indicted Ebens and Nitz on two counts of civil rights violations** (US. Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit I986 : I427).9 **Seven months later, a federal jury convicted Ebens of violating Chin's civil rights but acquitted him of conspiracy;** Nitz was acquitted on both charges. **Ebens was sentenced to twenty-five years in prison but was freed after posting a $20,000 bond** (US. Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit I986: I425). In I986, the Chin case hit another legal snag when a federal appeals court overturned the civil rights conviction on a technicality. Deluged with letters demanding a retrial, the Department of Justice agreed to retry Ebens. Citing the extensive publicity surrounding the case in Detroit, the department moved the trial to Cincinnati. 11 In May I987, five years after Chin's death, the Cincinnati jury acquitted Ebens of federal civil rights charges. Much to the outrage of Asian Americans across the country, **neither Ebens nor Nitz ever spent any time in prison for the killing** (Mar I987). Though the case did not turn out to the satisfaction of Asian Americans, it did leave an important organizational legacy

## CP

#### Mundane Citation Link – “the” before United States provides “shelter for despots” and deifies the Settler’s institutions as a geopolitical unity that unconsciously primes us towards aggression

Thrift 0 (Nigel | University of Warwick Vice Chancellor, University of Bristol Professor of Geography | “It’s the Little Things” | Geopolitical Traditions: A Century of Geopolitical Thought p.383-385. Google Books DOA: 3/11 //shree)

Let us finally come to one more arena: the arena of words. After all, here we might be thought to have the clearest example of representation at work, the word. Yet, what we do not get from critical geopolitics is a clear enough sense of how words function to bring about geopolitical change and it is not possible to do so as long as geopolitical forces continue to be framed as ‘big’ and ‘commanding’ (with all the masculine overtones). Some of the most potent geopolitical forces are, I suspect, lurking in the ‘little’ ‘details’ of people’s lives, what is “carried” in the specific variabilities of their activities’ (Shotter and Billig 1998: 23), in the context of utterances. And these variabilities have immediate consequences. Thus, as Bakhtin notes, and as is confirmed by the work in conversational analysis, ‘we sensitively catch the smallest shift in intonation, the slightest interruption of voices in anything of importance to us in another person’s practical everyday discourse. All those verbal sideward glances, reservations, loopholes, hints, threats do not slip past our ear, are not foreign to our own lips’ (Bakhtin 1984: 201). And we in turn show our stance to what they do or say also in fleeting bodily reactions, facial expressions, sounds of approval or disapproval, etc. Indeed, even in the continuously responsive unfolding of non-linguistic activities between ourselves and others—in a dance, in a handshake, or even a mere chance collision on the street—we are actively aware of whether the other’s motives are, so to speak, ‘in tune’ or ‘at odds’ with ours. And in our sense of their attunement or lack of it, we can sense their attitude to us as intimate or distant, friendly or hostile, deferential or arrogant, and so on. Thus, very effective work has been done in disciplines like anthropology and discursive psychology (Billig 1995, 1997) which attempts to provide a sense of how national identity and an accompanying geopolitical stance are inscribed through the smallest of details. Thus, for example, national identity is not accomplished in grand displays which incite the citizen to wave the flag in a fit of patriotic fervor. Instead, it goes on in more mundane citations: it is done unobtrusively on the margins of conscious awareness by little words such as ‘the’ and ‘we’. Each day we read or hear phrases such as ‘the prime minister’, ‘the nation’, or the ‘weather’. The definite article assumes deictically the national borders. It points to the homeland: but while we, the readers or listeners, understand the pointing, we do not follow it with our consciousness – it is a ‘seen but unnoticed’ feature of our everyday discourse. (Shotter and Billig 1998:20) Such work goes some way towards understanding the deep, often unconscious aggressions which lurk behind so much geopolitical reasoning’, which through small details build a sense of ‘us’ as not like ‘them’, and from which political programmes then flow as infractions are identified and made legible. In these few brief comments, I hoped to have outlined a parallel agenda for critical geopolitics, one still based on discourse, but on discourse understood in a broader way, and one which is less taken in by representation and more attuned to actual practices. In turn, such an agenda leads us away from interpretation of hyperbolic written and drawn rhetorics (which, I suspect, are often read by only a few and taken in by even fewer) towards the (I hesitate to say ‘real’) work of discourse, the constant hum of practices and their attendant territorializations within which geopower ferments and sometimes boils over.

#### Geopolitical unity authorizes unconditional violence

Dillon 99 (Michael, Prof of Politics, U of Lancaster, “The Scandal of the Refugee," Moral Spaces: Rethinking Ethics and World Politics, 109)

The scale of the politically instrumental— deliberate, legal, and policy- initiated—manufacture of estrangement in world politics necessarily calls into question, therefore, the very moral and political foundations and accomplishments of the modern age, particularly those of the state and the international system of states. In such circumstances—and given the vaunted political and moral claims made on behalf of states and of the international state system, as well as of so-called international society—we seem increasingly left not knowing to what symbolic space, to what understanding of the human way of being, we can entrust what we variously call freedom and humanity. Modern politics, the politics of modernity, continuously undermines, however, its own most violent, most intense, most totalizing attempts to securely free humanity. And this is not because of some technical deficiency on its part—the global politics of modernity is the expression of politics as techne. It is because it is not realizable. In the process the modern expression of identity politics, while thus disclosing something also about the modern world’s response to strangeness as such, provides a powerful intimation that the reception that the modern we accords the strangeness of the human way of being is what the very (dis)order of political modernity itself calls into question. Specifically, modern political subjectification creates its own peculiar form of political abjection. Originally applied to French Huguenots who fled to England after the revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685— and therefore a direct function of early modern absolutist understandings of the entailments of stable, legitimate, and authoritative political order, and their consequences—the refugee is precisely the figure that identities the political abjection of the modern age. Abject means cast out; abjection means also the act of expelling. It marks the failure of the political subject to be a pure political subject even in the act of trying to realize that ideal. Marking the porosity of limits of that which seeks to be the self-same, it is the waste that continuously disturbs identity, system, and order because as the outside produced by the inside, it continuously irrupts in a way that erodes the cry parameters by which the inside seeks to be defined. That which the effort to subjectify creates, its production marks the impossibility, the abject failure, of what modern political subjectification idealizes and aims to realize. For the political practices of burning, chasing, raping, expelling, degrading, murdering, humiliating, terrorizing, excoriating, removing, burying, hiding, suppressing, and devastating invent and re-invent the very waste they name and exorcise in the process of continuously reinagurating as politics, a certain imperative of political unity and malleable uniformity. Waste, as Ricoeur noted, is not waste without its wasting processes: its protocols of purgative production. Neither is it undifferentiated since its processes of production are themselves Plural. Abjection—the system’s own self-produced and self-producing perturbation — is neither inside nor outside but the in-between, the boundary or limit that enacts the differentiation. Abjection is (inter)national politics, and as (inter)national politics, it insists on a preoccupation with the inter anterior to the national.

#### Euphemism Link – describing terrocrats as “governments” provides “shelter for despots” and demobilizes agency by spectacularizing an all-powerful ill-defined extra-human foe instead of settlers that natives have experience negotiating around and defying for centuries

Mann 97 (Frederick, author and founder of Free World Order. NSPIC Debate. <http://www.mind-trek.com/reports/tl07e.htm>)

You might think, "So what? Why is this important?" Much of the time, it isn't. When the referent is a thing, a physical object, the distinction isn't important. But what happens when we use a word like "government?" What is the referent? The word "government" is generally used as a singular noun describing a creature that sounds like a human only much more powerful. Here are some examples from earlier articles: "Certainly the government is concerned only for itself and it's kin (politicians). Certainly the government will kill or imprison me if this is perceived to be in its interest. Certainly the government has the power to do so." ... "It may be very difficult for individual humans to be aware of the thought processes of governments..." and "Communicating with a government is not easy at all." You can easily find other examples in the newspaper or just listening to people talk, of the word "government" being used as if it refers to a single volitional entity. Who or what then, is this beast called "government?" Have you seen it? Have you spoken with it? Do you know any one who has? Even though the word "government" is often used as if the referent is a single being, it's obvious that it isn't. So what then does the word "government" refer to? Maybe nothing. No thing. Maybe there is no such THING as "government." At first, this may seem like a trivial distinction. After all, there are still policemen, judges, congressmen, IRS agents and other assorted terrocrats. Yes, there are people who call themselves "government." Some of them are very dangerous and all of them want to interfere with the lives of others. But thinking of "government" as an ill-defined, all-powerful foe, puts you in the position of a victim. How can anyone stand up to such a "government" as that? I certainly couldn't. This is a scary creature. But if I cross paths with a terrocrat or two, I can handle that. Terrocrats are human, with no magical powers. I can arrange my life to avoid or minimize contact with them. I can't defend myself against a mythical "government" beast. Terrocrats are human. I can deal with them.

#### Risk of a link to the plan’s sufficient – native syllabics cures us of the delusion that “government” exists

Mann 97 (Frederick, author and founder of Free World Order. NSPIC Debate. <http://www.mind-trek.com/reports/tl07e.htm>)

FM: You still don't know what this debate is about. It's not really about the "nature of government" -- it's about your hallucination: the De Rivaz Hallucination -- DRH. DRH is at the root of the "government" problem. If even 0.1 percent (one in a thousand) of freedom-lovers were to cure themselves of DRH and learn to communicate about it effectively, the cure would start spreading more rapidly. This would greatly accelerate the solution of the "government" problem. Even if only one percent of readers could fairly quickly understand this debate, it will probably induce a further 5-10 percent to start thinking and questioning. Some will also realize the profound increase in personal power that comes with transcending DRH. JDR quoting Shakespeare: "The first thing we do, let's kill all the lawyers." - Henry VI FM: No, John/Shakespeare. You got it horribly wrong. The first thing we do, let's kill all the hallucinations in our heads -- particularly the hallucination that the lawyers' noises and scribbles constitute "the law."

1. Maurice Stucke and Ariel Ezrachi, “The Rise, Fall, and Rebirth of the U.S. Antitrust Movement,” December 15, 2017 [↑](#footnote-ref-1)